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Simple Justice: Humanitarian Law as a
Defense Against Deportation
Jennifer Moore*
Each year, thousands of persons fleeing situations of military conflict in
their home countries are denied refuge in the United States. These denials
result in partfrom an asylum adjudicationprocess that requires applicants to
show that they are persecuted on an individualized basis, rather than that
they fear generalized conditions of violence. Jennifer Moore explores the development of the humanitarianlaw defense to deportation, which seeks to compel
immigration courts to recognize and apply internationalhumanitarian law.
Part I describes the evolution of the humanitarianlaw argument in immigration courts, and the lack of receptivity to the argument on the part offederal
courts. Part II considers the relationship between humanitarian law and
human rights law, and the possibilitiesfor grounding defenses to deportation
on internationalhuman rights law. The article concludes in Part III with
an evaluation of the prospectsfor the future development of the humanitarian
law defense, in light of recent legislative efforts to provide temporary refuge to
certain classes of civil war victims.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984 Jesus del Carmen Medina, a Salvadoran seeking asylum in
deportation proceedings brought against her by the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") in Harlingen, Texas,
made a motion for temporary relief from deportation on the ground
that violations of the laws of war were occurring in her native country.
Immigration Judge Michael Horn denied the relief requested, ruling
that although the United States was bound by the Geneva Convention
of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
("the Fourth Geneva Convention"), 1 there was insufficient evidence
2
that El Salvador was in breach of its Convention obligations.
* Associate Protection Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Conakry,
Guinea.
1. Geneva Convention No. IV, the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 33645, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(entered into force for the United States Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter "Fourth Geneva Convention"].
2. In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex. July 15, 1985), aff'd on
other grounds, Matter of Medina, Int. Dec. #3078 (BIA Oct. 7, 1988). Medina testified before
Judge Horn that as a result of military conflict between government and insurgent forces in El
Salvador, many Salvadorans are reluctant to leave their homes after dark for fear of being caught
in the cross-fire. Medina also testified that she was afraid she would be targeted as a suspected
guerrilla upon return to El Salvador. See In re Medina at 4.
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Six years later, in Washington, D.C. Immigration Court, Maria
Elena Santos-Gomez, her mother, Leonor, and three-year-old son,
Manuel Alonso, made a similar motion for relief from deportation to
El Salvador. Immigration Judge Paul A. Nejelski ordered that the
family not be deported to El Salvador for the duration of the civil
war, based upon overwhelming evidence of the existence of a customary
international norm requiring the provision of temporary refuge to
individuals displaced by internal armed conflict. 3
The Medina case heralded the beginning of concerted efforts by
immigrants' rights advocates and scholars to develop the law of temporary refuge in United States courts. The essence of their evolving
argument has been that in the event an individual flees an internal
conflict in which civilians are victims of violence, both international
agreements and customary international law provide a remedy in
United States courts in the form of temporary relief from deportation
until humanitarian law violations cease. The work of attorneys and
international law experts bore fruit with the Santos-Gomez decision,
when the immigration court recognized the customary norm of tem4
porary refuge and granted the relief requested.
This Article explores the development of the temporary refuge
theory, addressing the component parts of the international defense to
deportation, including treaty provisions, customary law and United
States foreign relations law. It focuses on the impact of the various
arguments for temporary refuge in particular United States courts,
and concludes with an evaluation of the status of the theory and the
prospects for its increased recognition in the future. Implicit in the
analysis is the conviction that the law of temporary refuge contributes
to the development of a conceptual framework for affirming the humanity and juridical personality of all immigrants.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A DEFENSE TO
DEPORTATION
A. Legal Roadblocks: The Limitations of PoliticalAsylum Adjudication in
the United States
Temporary refuge is of most vital interest to individuals who are
found not to qualify for relief under domestic legislation enacted to
After the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, Medina was deemed

eligible for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1987, hence the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared her pending federal appeal moot.

3. In re Santos-Gomez, Santos-Trejos and Ramirez-Santos, Nos. A29 564 781, A29 564
785, and A29 564 801 (Immigr. Ct., Washington, D.C. Aug. 24, 1990). See infra note 78
and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 2.
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provide legal status to victims of persecution in their native countries.
In the Refugee Act of 1980, 5 Congress adopted the substance of article
1 of the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("the Protocol," or "the Refugee Protocol"). 6 In article 1,
the Protocol, in keeping with the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees ("the Refugee Convention"), 7 defined a refugee as an individual with a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion." s The Protocol also incorporated article 33 of the Convention, which forbids the forcible return
of an individual whose "life or freedom would be threatened on account
of" one of the five grounds enumerated in the refugee definition. 9 This
prohibition against involuntary repatriation is known as the norm of
non-refoulement. 10
Thus the 1980 Refugee Act, as a result of incorporating relevant
provisions of the Protocol, affords two specific forms of relief from
deportation. Individuals who qualify as "refugees" under the "wellfounded fear" definition are eligible for a discretionary grant of political
asylum, I1 while individuals whose life or freedom would be threatened
upon return to their native countries on one of the five enumerated
grounds are eligible for a mandatory order withholding deportation,
which the Attorney General must grant upon making the requisite
findings. 12
5. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Star. 102 (codified asamended in various
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
6. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
7. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 152 at art. 1, § (A)(2).
8. Refugee Protocol, art. 1, § 2 incorporated the Refugee Convention definition by reference.
Congress' adoption of the United Nations' non-ideological definition eliminated a previous bias
in our domestic legislation favoring persons fleeing Communist regimes. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42XA). See A. FRAGOMAI'N & S. BELL, IMMIGRATION PRIMER 196 (1985).
9. Refugee Convention, art. 33, § 1; Refugee Protocol, art. 1, § 1.
10. See G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 82 (1983).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). See, e.g. Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982). The
United States Attorney General may order a grant of asylum after weighing factors such as
whether entry into the United States was legal, whether fraud was perpetrated on United States
immigration officials, and whether the individual applied for refugee status
in a United States
consulate abroad.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). This provision of the Act adopts the prohibitory language of article
33 of the Refugee Convention. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Case law interpreting
this provision has established that to be eligible for withholding, individuals must demonstrate
a "clear probability" that they will be persecuted if forced to return to their native countries.
I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)).
Withholding of deportation is a lesser form of relief than political asylum. One who is granted
asylum cannot be deported to any country, and is eligible for adjustment of status to legal
permanent resident after one year. Withholding merely signifies that an individual cannot be
deported to the nation from which he or she fled, until his or her life or freedom is no longer
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Individuals who flee to the United States from a country which is
embroiled in an internal conflict face two problems when they apply
for political asylum and withholding of deportation in the United
States. First, many individuals are statutorily ineligible for either form
of relief. They may fear being caught in the cross-fire of a guerrilla
war but they are unprotected by the Refugee Act, which does not
define persecution to encompass persons with a well-founded fear of
civil war violence. 13
Second, the claims of many civil war victims who are statutorily
eligible for asylum or withholding of deportation under a proper
reading of the Refugee Act are prejudiced by the fact that they come
from nations in which persecution is widespread. Since the mid- 1980s,
federal courts have stated that although widespread conditions of
violence and persecution are not in themselves sufficient for a grant of
asylum, they strengthen petitions for such relief by establishing an
objective basis for the well-founded fear alleged by asylum applicants. 14
Despite these rulings, immigration judges continue to penalize individuals who come from countries in which high percentages of the
population are potential or actual targets of persecution. 15
threatened. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a). Furthermore, the individual still may be deported to another
country.
The "well-founded fear" test for asylum eligibility embodies a more subjective and more
generous standard of proof than the objective "clear probability" threshold which is applied in
withholding of deportation cases. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987).
13. The United States Congress, in debating the Refugee Act, considered and rejected a
definition of refugee which included victims of armed conflict. See S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 23, 224-25 (1979). While both the Refugee Protocol and the United
States Refugee Act limit refugee status to individuals who fear persecution on one of the five
enumerated grounds, see supra text accompanying note 8, however, other international entities
accord refugee status to individuals displaced by civil war. See Organization of African Unity
1969 Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa, art. 1, § 2 ("the term 'refugee' shall also apply
to every person who, owing to . . . events seriously disturbing public order. . . is compelled
to leave .... ");1984 Declaration of Cartagena (drafted by participants in the Colloquium on
International Refugee Protection in Central America, Mexico and Panama, conducted under the
auspices ofthe Government of the Republic of Colombia, and cosponsored by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, the Regional Third World Studies Center and the Faculty of
Law of the University of Cartagena de Indias [hereinafter Cartagena Convention] (copy on file
at the HARvARD HuosAs RIGHTS JouRNL. office) (Conclusion #3: "the definition or concept
of a refugee . . . is one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol, includes . . . persons who have fled their country because their lives,
safety and freedom have been threatened by... internal conflict.. ."). See also Helton, Assisting
CentralAmerican Refugees, Chr. Sci. Mon., May 31, 1989, at 19.
14. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1984) ("the significance of a
specific threat to an individual's life or freedom is not lessened by the fact that the individual
resides in a country where the lives and freedom of a large number of persons are threatened. If
anything . . . that may make the threat more serious or credible"); see also Hernandez-Ortiz v.
INS, 777 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1985).
15. A representative of the United States Committee for Refugees commented that "[QIhe
BIA has arrived at a paradoxical position that, in effect, favors asylum seekers from less violent
and dangerous countries, while essentially requiring a higher standard of persecution from
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Individuals who flee persecution in a nation at war with itself face
additional impediments within the asylum adjudication process when
their government is friendly with the United States.1 6 Throughout
the 1980s, despite the non-ideological language used in the Refugee
Act, individuals from Communist countries more easily obtained
grants of asylum than those who fled nations favored by United States
foreign policy. There exists substantial evidence to support allegations
of ideological bias within the asylum-granting system. 17 Moreover,
whether a nation is a recipient of a significant amount of military or
economic assistance from the United States also tends to influence
asylum adjudication.'
Despite the eleven-year history of the Refugee Act, the governing
ideology of the nation of origin continues to indicate the likelihood
of an asylum applicant's success. 19 Given the inherent limitations of
political areas where violence is now more widespread."

AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL, REASON-

ABLE FEAR: HUmAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLCY 26 (Mar. 1990).
16. Immigration Judges forward copies of every application for political asylum and withholding of deportation to the United States Stare Department Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, which issues the Immigration Judge an opinion regarding the validity of
the claim, often without a legal analysis of the applicant's case. See UNITED STATES CommrrrEE
FOR REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2930 (Dec. 1986), [hereinafter DESPITE-A GENEROUS SPIRIT]; see also Anker, Determining Asylum
Claims in the United States, ExEcUTivE SuMMARY 4 (Jan. 1990) ("one of the measures of
ideological bias [in the asylum adjudication process] is the influence of the State Department's
Advisory Opinion . . .').
Pursuant to new asylum regulations promulgated by the INS in July 1990, immigration
judges now are permitted to decide asylum claims without considering the Bureau's advisory
opinion if it is not made available within sixty days of the Bureau's notice of the application.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,682 (1990) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.11). This new regulation
may help to depoliticize the asylum adjudication process.
17. See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U.
MICH. J. L. REP. 243, 253 (1984):
Statistics provided by the INS for fiscal year 1983 . . . [show that] seventy-eight
percent of the Ethiopian . . . and -forty-four percent of the Romanian cases decided
received political asylum, all involving persons fleeing Communist-dominated regimes.
On the other hand, asylum was granted in less than eleven percent of the Philippine
. . . two percent of the Haitian, two percent of the Guatemalan and three percent of
the Salvadoran cases.
Id. See also DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT supra note 16, at 8 (citing statistics that reflect a
double standard in the granting of asylum to petitioners from "unfriendly" governments as
compared to those from "friendly" and anti-Communist governments); GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-EW

DENIED

DEPORTED 15 (1987) (statistics presented for 1984 indicate that only 2% of the Salvadoran
applications were granted, in contrast to 49% of the Polish and 66% of the Iranian applications).
18. For example, while the Salvadoran government has received over $4 billion in financial
aid from the United States since 1980, a mere two to three percent of Salvadoran asylum claims
were granted over the course of that same decade. Goldsron, Down the SalvadoranDrain, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1990, at A27, col. 2.
19. Data gathered for fiscal year 1989, indicates that 81% of the Soviet, 65.8% of the
Ethiopian, and 90.9% of the Romanian cases decided resulted in positive asylum decisions. In
contrast, asylum was granted in only 7% of the Philippine, 3.5% of the Haitian, 1.9% of the
Guatemalan and 2.3% of the Salvadoran cases. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 15, at 3.
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the refugee definition, combined with the operation of political factors
within the asylum adjudication process, potential victims of civil war
violence might well seek forms of relief from deportation other than
those explicitly provided in the Refugee Act.

B. Creative Response: Appeal to InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Given the historical and philosophical link between the United
States Refugee Act and the United Nations Refugee Convention and
Refugee Protocol, it was perhaps natural for asylum-seekers denied
relief under domestic refugee law to seek alternative forms of relief
under international law. In addition to prohibiting the deportation of
individuals who face persecution upon return to their countries, pursuant to the non-refoulement provision of article 33 of the Refugee
Convention, 20 international law also protects against the deportation
of persons who face civil war violence upon return.
Public international law ("international law") comprises those obligations which are binding on states, and in some cases international
21
organizations, in their dealings with each other and with individuals.
The primary sources of international law are treaties, which are signed
by individual countries, and customary norms, which are rules widely
recognized in practice by members of the world community, and
complied with out of a conviction that they are legally binding (opinio
22
juris sive necessitatis).
Ratification of a treaty creates obligations on the international
plane. 23 In contrast, under United States law all but self-executing
treaty provisions must be incorporated into domestic legislation before
they can be applied by United States courts. Self-executing provisions
are those which are directly applicable by their own terms, and need
not be specifically implemented by Congressional legislation. 24 Cus-

20. Refugee Convention, art. 33, § 1.
21. See M. JANIs, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (1988).
22. Id. at 4-5, 38-40. The prohibition against torture is a rule which United States courts
recognize as a norm of customary international law. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
882 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit found that this customary norm is part of United States
law. Se id. at 887 ("international law is part of our law") (citing The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
Violations of a customary norm do not serve as evidence that the norm is not in force. Rather,
when a government carries out an official policy of torture which it vigorously denies, this selfjustifying behavior indicates the state's recognition of the binding character of the norm. Perluss
& Hartman, Temporary Refuge. Emergence of a Customary Norm 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 572 (1986)
("Evasive strategies used by states to avoid the customary norm ... do not undercut the norm.
Rather, these strategies implicitly suggest a recognition of its existence and obligatory character.")
23. M. JANIs, supra note 21, at 18.
24. Id. at 74.
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17

tomary norms, in contrast, are by their nature self-executing, and
2
never require implementing legislation. 5
International humanitarian law is the subset of international law
which deals specifically with the conduct of war, and encompasses
principles governing the treatment of non-combatants and regulations
controlling the use of weapons. 26 These humanitarian law rules, which
seek to limit the impact of war on noncombatants, are of crucial
interest to civilian victims of internal conflict and hence of greatest
relevance to this analysis.
The Fourth Geneva Convention is the primary humanitarian law
treaty protecting noncombatants who are potential victims of civil
strife. 27 Article 2 of the Convention states, "Ihe present Convention
shall apply to all cases of ... armed conflict which may arise between
two or more. . .High Contracting Parties .... ",28 Article 2 signifies
that, as a whole, the Convention applies to international rather than
internal armed conflicts. Article 3 of the Convention, however, specifically establishes that "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an
international character, ''29 i.e., internal conflicts, all civilians shall
enjoy minimal protections, including the right to life, humane treatment and basic due process. 3° Moreover, article 1 of the Convention
provides that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect
and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."31
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines "[plersons protected by the Convention" as "those who ...find themselves ...in
the hands of a Party to the conflict . . . of which they are not
nationals.' 3 2 The status of "protected persons" thus appears at first to
encompass only civilians who were driven outside their nation of origin
25. See L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 155 (2d ed. 1987).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 802.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 3.
Id.art.
3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character .. .each Party to
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no part in the hostilities... shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely.. . .To this end the following acts are prohibited... :
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

31. Id. art. I (emphasis added).
32. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 4.
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by an international armed conflict, and who subsequently find themselves within the territorial boundaries of another party to the conflict. 33 Finally, the Fourth Geneva Convention specifically provides in
article 45 that "IpIrotected persons shall not be transferred to a Power
which is not a party to the Convention," 34 and in article 147 that the
"unlawful deportation . . . of a protected person" is a grave breach of
3
the Convention.
A tension exists within the language of the Fourth Geneva Convention between the extension of protections to all victims of armed
conflict and the limitation of such protections to individuals displaced
by international conflicts. This tension may be resolved in favor of a
broader application of Convention principles by interpreting treaty
provisions in light of evolving customary international law.
All four Geneva Conventions of 1949 codify several customary
norms which had emerged prior to that time. Among these norms is
the principle of protection, which stands for the proposition that "the
State must ensure the national and international protection of persons
who have fallen into its power." 36 Because the principle of protection
is not limited in application to a particular type of armed conflict, it
could well be argued that the Geneva Convention prohibitions against
deportation contained in articles 45 and 147 extend to civilians forced
3
to leave situations of internal as well as international armed conflict.
38
Since its first use in the Medina case, the humanitarian law defense
to deportation has faced numerous obstacles in the courtroom. However, the argument possesses two basic attributes which have led
advocates further to seek its acceptance. First, the humanitarian law
prohibition against deportation turns an inherent weakness of the
33. See id. arts. 2, 4.

34. Id. art. 45.
35. Id. art. 147.
36. J. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION Op WAR VIcTIMs 47 (1975)
[hereinafter PICTET, HuMAITARAN LAw]. The modern analog of the principle of protection is
the customary norm of temporary refuge, which prohibits nations from forcibly returning
individuals who have fled widespread conditions of violence stemming from internal conflict in
their nations of origin. See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 22, at 554. An essential attribute of
the norm of temporary refuge is the recognition on the part of the state that forcibly deporting
an individual to a nation embroiled in an internal conflict in which civilians are targeted is
fundamentally at odds with an obligation, first articulated in the principle of protection, "to
ensure the . . . protections of persons who have fallen into its power." See J. PjCTET, HUMANITARIAN LAw, supra, at 47. The principle of protection has been upheld in United States
immigration court. See In re Santos-Gomez, Santos-Trejos and Ramirez-Santos, Nos. A29 564

781, A29 564 785, and A29 564 801 (Immigr. Ct., Washington, D.C. Aug. 24, 1990) at 10
("this court finds a right to non-return to a country engaged in civil war which is ...
on this court"). But see Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688 (9th Cit. 1991).

binding

37. See Parker, Geneva Convention Protetionsfor SalvadoranRefugees: An InternationalLaw Defense
against Deportationand ajatifiationfor Sanctuary, 13 IMMIGR. NEWSL. 7, nn.59, 61 (1984).
38. In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex. July 15, 1985), aff'd
on other grounds, Matter of Medina, Int. Dec. #3078 (BIA Oct. 7, 1988).
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asylum claim of civil war victims into a strength. While the existence
of widespread violence and persecution resulting from internal conflict
has weakened the asylum claims of many individuals, it is precisely
these generalized conditions which serve as the basis for relief under
39
international humanitarian law.
Second, the use of humanitarian law as a defense against deportation
in the context of a petition for asylum highlights the connection
between war and persecution. Rather than de-emphasizing the epidemic level of abuses carried out against vast sectors of the civilian
population in the petitioner's nation of origin, the humanitarian law
argument assists advocates in demonstrating that widespread persecution of suspected opponents is a means by which parties to the
conflict punish dissidence and instill terror as a means of control. The
humanitarian law defense enables advocates, judges, and the public to
understand that the atrocities of war often entail multiple cases of
individualized persecution, and that targeted human rights abuses are
40
a part of waging a vigorous military campaign.
C. Development of the HumanitarianLaw Defense
1. Initial Efforts: The Medina Case
The development of the modern humanitarian law defense to deportation achieved national prominence on September 9, 1984, when
Jesus del Carmen Medina sought relief from deportation under the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as under the asylum and
41
withholding of deportation provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980.
Medina argued that the United States, as a signatory to the Fourth
Geneva Convention, was obligated to grant her relief from deportation
to El Salvador, a country in which violations of the minimal protections
required by article 3 were occurring. She contended that this obligation is based on the United States' pledge under article 1 to "respect
and ensure respect for the . . . Convention. '42 Medina's request for
39. The customary norm of temporary refuge protects individuals who have fled "generalized
violence." Perluss & Hartman, supra note 22 at 554. This "situational approach" required to
determine eligibility for temporary relief from deportation contrasts sharply with the "individ-

ualist definition" of a refugee put forth in the Refugee Convention. Id. at 583.
40. See A.mNEST INTERNATIONAL REPORT 88 (1990) (documenting executions of large
numbers of unarmed civilians by Salvadoran military personnel).
41. In re Medina at 2-3. Advocates have filed temporary refuge motions in deportation
proceedings throughout the United States since the mid-1980s. Medina is emphasized here
because it involved the first motion of its kind to be fully briefed, argued and decided on the

merits.
42. Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 1, 3. Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
obligates "each Party to the [non-international] conflict" to respect the rights of civilians. See
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 3, § 1. Since the United States is not a party to the conflict in
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relief was based on the logic that deporting an individual to a nation
in which violations of humanitarian law are occurring is fundamentally
at odds with a pledge to promote respect for the norms of humanitarian
law.
After finding Medina ineligible for asylum and withholding of
deportation, 43 Immigration Judge Michael Horn also denied her relief
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, 44 subsequent to a full analysis
of her humanitarian law claim. Judge Horn preliminarily held that
he had jurisdiction to hear a Convention claim, based on the power
delegated to him by Congress to determine deportability under the
relevant provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA")
or "any other law or treaty . . . . "4 Secondly, he ruled that in light
of the Geneva Convention's clear "purpose . . . to prevent civilians
from becoming direct victims of war, the Convention provisions according rights to civilians are self-executing in U.S. courts." 46 Horn
ultimately concluded, however, that although article 1 imposes domestically enforceable obligations upon the United States, there was
insufficient evidence that violations of article 3 were occurring in El
47
Salvador.
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board"),
upheld Judge Horn's denial of all three forms of relief requested but
rejected his rationale. The BIA affirmed Horn's analysis that international law is United States law and must be applied by United States
courts, 4 but found that article 1 is not a self-executing treaty provision
El Salvador, it has no independent obligation under article 3 to protect Salvadoran nationals
from violations of their article 3 rights. Article 1 was essential to Medina's claim because it
directly obligates the United States, as a signatory to the Convention, to "respect and ensure
respect for the . . .Convention." See Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 1. For an analysis of the
Geneva Convention rights of aliens in deportation proceedings see Kravitz, Beyond Atylum and
Withholding of Deportation:A Frameworkfor Relief Under Geneva Convention IV of 1949, 1 TEMPLE
INT'L & COMP. L. J. 263, 282 (1987).
43. In re Medina at 10.
44. Id. at 28.
45. Id. at 12. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 66 Stat. 209 (1952) (current
version codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
46. In re Medina at 23, 18 (citingJ. Picrair, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw 11 (1966) [hereinafter J. PicrET, PRINCIPLES]). Judge Horn stated, "T]he Geneva Convention texts have been drafted solely for the benefit of the individual." Id. at 18-19 (emphasis
in original) (citing J. PicrTr, PRINCIPLES, supra, at 12). On this basis, he concluded that "the
rights provided [inthe Fourth Geneva Convention] . . . are self-executing and need no further
domestic legislation to ensure their respect in the domestic forums of High Contracting Parties."
Id. at 23.

For a similar view see Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable
German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INTL L. 550, 578 (1971) ("a treaty ought to be deemed selfexecuting if it involves the rights and duties of individuals").
47. In re Medina at 28. Judge Horn held that Medina had not met her "burden to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence . . . the alleged violations of Article 3 in El Salvador." Id.
48. Matter of Medina, Int. Dec. #3078 (BIA 1988) at 14-15 (citing The Paquete Habana,
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on the ground that it "does not evince an intent to create judicially
enforceable rights in private persons." 49 The BIA thus concluded that
article 1 could not be read to obligate the United States, as a nonparty to the conflict in El Salvador, to withhold deportation of a
50
foreign national illegally present within its borders.
In addition to the treaty-based humanitarian law claim, the BIA
considered whether there might be an argument for relief under customary law. A number of humanitarian law scholars have noted that
nations generally feel compelled to provide emergency relief from
deportation to victims of civil strife. 5x These experts conclude that
such actions are evidence
of the existence of a customary norm of
"temporary refuge." 52 Despite the historical and contemporary examples of the provision of temporary refuge to individuals displaced by
civil war, the BIA found that such conduct is undertaken on a vol-

175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[i]ntemational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination")).
49. Id. at 10.
50. The Board held that article l's language was analogous to United Nations Charter
provisions which had been interpreted as non-self-executing. Id. at 10-11 (citing Frolova v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Board
neglected to point out that in Frolova, the Seventh Circuit articulated a test for reaching a
determination regarding self-execution which included an inquiry into "(1) the language and
purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; [and]
(3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement .
P..."
Frolava, 761 F.2d at 373.
In light of Picret's estimation that the overriding intention of the Fourth Geneva Convention
was "to prevent civilians from becoming direct victims of war," (J. Pic'rar, PR5NCIPLES, supra
note 46, at 11) the Frolova test supports a finding that article I is self-executing.
51. See,e.g., G. GoODWIN-GiLL, supra note 10, at 119 ("[aldmission on a temporary basis,
especially in situations of large-scale influx, remains an inescapable fact of life, and is practiced
by states throughout the world").
52. For an extensive discussion of the evidence of state practice and opinio juris underlying
the norm of temporary refuge, see Perluss & Hartman, supra note 22.
Representative examples of state practice favoring the granting of temporary refuge include
France and Britain providing temporary protection to Spanish Civil War refugees beginning in
1936, see id. at 559, and, during the 1980s, Sudan granting safe haven to individuals displaced
by the internal strife in Ethiopia and Chad, see id. at 560, Pakistan sheltering civilians fleeing
Afghanistan, se id. at 564, and Belize providing a general amnesty to Guatemalans and
Salvadorans until such time as the conflicts in their respective countries were resolved. See id. at
567. As evidence of opiniojuris, the governments of Pakistan, Djibouti, Thailand and Turkey,
among others, have each referred to "universally accepted principles," "humanitarian obligations"
or "humanitarian responsibility" in official declarations characterizing the provision of temporary
refuge to civil war victims in each of their respective countries. Moreover, United States Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance, speaking to the Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations in July 1979, expressed the United States' "support for the internationally recognized
principles of temporary shelter and asylum." See id. at n. 124.
The Group of Experts on Temporary Refuge in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, which
convened in Geneva in April 1981, also stated that although states had the discretion to grant
or withhold asylum, they "'should give at least temporary asylum"' where life itself was at stake.
See G. GOoDwwN-GILL, supra note 10, at 118.
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untary basis rather than out of a sense of legal obligation, and that
the opinio juris necessary to support the existence of the norm was
53
lacking.
After ruling on the treaty-based and customary grounds for relief,
the BIA also made two determinations based on domestic law. First,
the BIA held that regardless of whether the Fourth Geneva Convention
is directly applicable in United States courts, and irrespective of the
purported existence of a customary norm of temporary refuge, the
Refugee Act of 1980 constitutes controlling legislation, and hence
overrules international humanitarian norms. 54 Secondly, the Board
found that the Attorney General had not delegated to immigration
judges or the BIA the authority to grant temporary relief from deportation on grounds other than those specified in the Immigration
55
and Nationality Act.

2. Further Elaborations: The Three-Pronged Approach
In the aftermath of the two Medina decisions, political asylum
advocates around the country responded to the BIA's rejection of the
humanitarian law defense to deportation.5 6 Attorneys working on the
temporary refuge arguments focused on three potential weaknesses of
the humanitarian law defense. First, most immigration judges are not
schooled in international law and therefore are not necessarily con53. The Board in Medina posed the question whether a hypothetical international conference
convened to consider the plight of civil war victims would decide that such "displaced persons"
ought to be included under the definition of refugee contained in article 1 of the Refugee
Convention. Partly because the Board was of the opinion that such a conference would not take
this action, it concluded that the norm did not exist. Matter of Medina at 16.
54. Id. at 17. The BIAs analysis relied upon two Supreme Court cases. In Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1887), the Court determined that a ratified treaty, like a statute,
could be overruled by a subsequent statute, holding that the last expression of Congressional
will governs. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), the Court held that international customary norms were part of United States law and were to be applied by United
States courts so long as there was no controlling domestic legislation.
55. Matter of Medina at 13. The BIA specifically held that it lacked the authority to grant
extended voluntary departure" ("EVD"), a discretionary form of relief from deportation which
the Attorney General has granted to members of specific national groups including Ethiopians
and Poles, on the grounds that "such authority has not been delegated by the Attorney General
to the immigration judges or this Board." Id.
The INA provisions which authorize Immigration and Naturalization Service Operating
Instruction ("INS 01") 242. 10e(3), the regulation empowering the Attorney General to grant
EVD, however, also authorize immigration judges and the BIA to grant "voluntary departure"
to otherwise deportable aliens. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242(b) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)). See Smith, Temporary Safe Haven for De Facto Refugees from War
Violence and Disasters, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 509, 523 (1988).
56. For example, the International Legal Defense Project, based at Catholic Charities of San
Francisco, was founded in 1987 to develop and present arguments for temporary refuge under
international treaty and customary law before the judges of the San Francisco Immigration Court.
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vinced of their obligation or authority to consider international law. 7
Second, immigration judges have resisted recognizing that article I of
the Fourth Geneva Convention is a self-executing treaty provision.
Finally, the customary norm argument, although free from the selfexecution problem, may be less compelling to judges as a basis for
relief due to the amorphous nature of unwritten legal obligations. In
response to these challenges to the temporary refuge theory, advocates
and experts developed a comprehensive, three-pronged argument for
relief under humanitarian law which addresses the jurisdictional as
58
well as conventional and customary law issues.
The three-pronged argument begins by establishing that international law is United States law5 9 and emphasizes that under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, "all Treaties...
60
shall be the supreme Law of the Land" on a par with federal statutes.
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that international
customary law also is United States law, "to be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice .... ..61 Finally, INA § 242(b)
instructs immigration judges to consult the provisions of the INA or
62
any other law or treaty . . ." in determining deportability.
The second prong of the argument seeks to establish that article 1
of the Fourth Geneva Convention obligates the United States to refrain
from deporting foreign nationals when violations of article 3 are taking
place in their countries of origin. This analysis applies the signatories'
pledge in article 1, to "ensure respect for the . ..Convention in all
circumstances . . . ," to situations in which civilians are the victims
of violence resulting from article 3 violations. 63 The argument requires
57. Refugee policy analysts have called for improved education of INS officials and immigration judges in domestic and international refugee law, as well as in international human
rights law and the occurrence of human rights violations in particular countries around the
world. While training programs existed during the 1980s, they were widely regarded as
inadequate. See Despite a Generous Spirit, supra note 16, at 30-31, 42. Pursuant to new asylum
regulations promulgated in July 1990, a new body of asylum officers with exclusive jurisdiction
over administrative asylum applications will be trained in international and human rights law.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,680 (1990); see also infra note 105.
58. For a full elaboration of the three-pronged theory, see Motion for Temporary Refuge and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities [hereinafter Temporary Refuge Memorandum], In re
Raquel de los Angeles Madrid-Norio, No. A24 292 084 (Immigr. Ct. San Francisco, Apr. 3,
1987); Temporary Refuge Memorandum, In re Coralia Luz Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226

(filed in Immigr. Ct., San Francisco Mar. 9, 1988); Supplemental Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Temporary Refuge [hereinafter Supplemental Memorandum], In re Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco July 14, 1988).
59. Temporary Refuge Memorandum, In reMadrid-Norio at 3-5; Supplemental Memorandum, In re Aguilar-Moreno at 2-12.
60. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.2.
61. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The BIA recognized this proposition
in the Medina case. See Matter of Medina, Int. Dec. #3078 (BIA 1988) at 14-15.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1952).
63. See In re Medina at 22; see also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in
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courts to find that article 1 is self-executing, on the ground that it
was intended to confer rights on individuals and to limit the brutality
of war wherever possible."
Due to the open-textured language of article 1 and the complexities
of the self-execution doctrine, this prong of the argument is perhaps
the most vulnerable. However, two alternative positions provide a
defense against deportation. First, the more expansive customary principle of protection which anteceded and was codified by the Geneva
Conventions also requires the United States to refrain from deporting
individuals to situations characterized by violations of humanitarian
law. This principle was never limited to the context of international
65
conflicts.
Second, a request for temporary refuge does not assert that article
1 obligates the United States to intervene affirmatively in the internal
affairs of a foreign nation to prevent violations of article 3. Rather,
the United States is asked not to cause further humanitarian law
violations by forcing individuals to return to their native countries,
where they are likely to become victims of civil war violence. Even if
it is not deemed self-executing, article 1 prohibits the United States

and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27)
(article 1 obligates the United States "not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict
in Nicaragua to act in violations on the provisions of Article 3"); but see In reMadrid-Norio,
No. A24 292 084 at 17 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco Nov. 20, 1987) ("language of Article 1
does not relate to the provisions of Article 3").
64. An individual rights-oriented analysis of the doctrine of self-executing treaties suggests
that articles 1 and 3 both should be deemed self-executing. As Senator Mansfield eloquently
the Geneva Conventions
admonished the Senate on July 6, 1955, as that body prepared to ratify
only a few score of lives are preserved because of the efforts at Geneva, then the
of 1949: "[Ilf
patience and laborious work of all who have contributed to that goal will not have been in
vain." 101 CONG. REC. 9971 (1955). See also In re Medina at 24-25 ("[b]ecause the emphasis
of the Geneva Conventions is so clearly the protection of the individual ... it logically follows
that in order to fulfill the purpose ... of the [Fourth Geneva] Convention, an individual should
be entitled to secure his rights under the Convention in any . . . Party's domestic courts
whenever applicable"); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (a treaty is selfexecuting "whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or
subject may be determined"); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1923) ("treaties
for the protection of citizens" likely to be deemed self-executing); Riesenfeld, supra note 46, at
involves the rights and duties
578 ("a treaty ought to be deemed self-executing if it [inter alia]
of individuals"); People of Saipan v. United States Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir.
1974) (court should consider "the immediate and long-range social consequences of self- or nonself-execution"); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1985) (court should weigh the circumstances surrounding the signing of the treaty); but see Sei
Fujii v. State of California, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617, 722 (1952) (article 56 of the Charter
of the United Nations, under which nations "pledge . . . joint and separate action ... for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55" (which include "universal respect for...
human rights"), deemed non-self-executing).
For a fuller analysis of the self-execution doctrine, see Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Sef-Exccuting
Treaties in the UnitedStates: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986).
65. SeeJ. Pic'rar, Hu mAmTARaLA LAw, supra note 36, at 47.
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from producing an outcome that would violate the spirit of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.66
The third and last prong of the argument asserts that the customary
norm of temporary refuge independently obligates the United States
not to deport foreign nationals while humanitarian law violations occur
in their countries of origin. Recognizing the extensive evidence that
the practice of according temporary refuge has evolved into customary
law, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") has stated that temporary refuge has achieved the status
67
of a peremptory norm.
Advocates also must clarify that the Refugee Act of 1980 does not
constitute controlling legislation which supersedes the norm of temporary refuge, 68 since these two sources of law provide discrete forms
of relie 8 9 to distinct classes of people. That the drafters of the Refugee
Act declined to include victims of civil strife within the definition of
a "refugee" 70 does not preclude civil war victims from all forms of
relief. The Refugee Act of 1980 incorporates the language of the
United Nations Refugee Convention and the United Nations Refugee

66. Iwasawa, supra note 64, at 645, states:
U.S. courts have consistently recognized that provisions of constitutions and statutes
are the law of the land, whether or not they are self-executing. Non-self-executing
treaty provisions should not be treated any differently, particularly in light of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution which provides that all treaties, including
non-self-executing ones, are "the Supreme Law of the Land."
Id. (citing Carow v. Board of Educ. of New York, 272 N.Y. 341, 347, 6 N.E.2d 47, 50
(1936) and U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl.2).
The impact of non-self-executing treaty provisions may best be understood by considering the

analogous force of non-self-executing Constitutional provisions. United States courts must enforce
domestic statutes in a manner which upholds the principles embodied in non-self-executing
provisions of the United States Constitution. See id. at 688.
As the Superior Court of New York held in 1895:
While a provision of the constitution may need legislation to enforce its principles,
and give them affirmative effect, yet, without any legislation, such provision may
have a negative force, in prohibiting acts in violation of its terms ... thuswhile, from
lack of legislation, its principlescannot beaffirmatively enforced, neither.., can those principles
belawfully violated, or any statute violating them be enforced.
In re Sweeley, 33 N.Y.S. 269, 272-73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1895) (emphasis added).
67. U.N.H.C.R., REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES
para. 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62 (1985).
Peremptory orjus cogens norms are those norms of international law from which no derogation
is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
68. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900) (courts need only "give effect to
[international rules] . . . in the absence of. . . [a) public act of their own government in
relation to the matter").
69. Relief in the form of temporary refuge does not confer the equivalent of refugee status
on individuals lacking a "well-founded fear of persecution." Rather, it accords temporary relief
from deportation to victims of internal conflict, until it is safe for them to return to their nations
of origin.
70. See supra note 13.
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Protocol into domestic law. The Act does not, however, invoke the
71
language of customary or treaty-based international humanitarianlaw.
D. The Impact of the HumanitarianLaw Defense in United States Courts
1. Deportation Proceedings
The three-pronged humanitarian law argument for temporary refuge
has not yet been successful in deportation proceedings in the United
States. In In re Madrid-Norioand In re Aguilar-Moreno, two cases heard
in San Francisco Immigration Court in 1987 and 1988, respectively,
the presiding immigration judges found that although violations of
humanitarian law were taking place in El Salvador, neither article 1
of the Fourth Geneva Convention nor customary law obligate the
United States to grant relief from deportation to a civilian fleeing
72
violence due to civil strife in that country.
In the Aguilar-Moreno case, Judge Bernard J. Hornbach determined
that the "any other law or treaty" provision of INA § 242(b), which
sets forth the possible bases for a judicial determination of deportability, refers exclusively to United States statutes and treaties and
excludes international customary law.73 Moreover, Judge Hornbach
explicitly stated that "Itihe authority of an Immigration Judge is
limited to authority specifically granted by statute or regulation ....
'Immigration Judges . . .are creatures of statute .... ',,,4
Regarding the second, treaty-based, prong of the humanitarian law
argument, Judge Hornbach concluded that the "ensure respect" lan71. See Helton, supra note 17, at 251. The class of individuals served by the Refugee
Convention may be distinguished from those protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention:
Several instruments of international law [such as] . . .the Convention on the Status
of Refugees . ..have defined the term refugee. The definitions in question arevalid
for the particular purposes of law for which they areformulated but are too technical
and too limited in scope to meet the requirementsof the Geneva Convention.
PICTET, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (1958) at 263-64 [hereinafter PICTET, COMMENTARY] (emphasis
added).
In late 1990, the United States Congress amended the INA to create a new "temporary
protected status" for individuals present in the United States who have been displaced from their
nations of origin by civil war and other conditions of upheaval. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub,
L. 101-649, § 301, 104 Stat. 4978 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 244A (1990)). This indication
of a specific legislative intent to protect civil war victims would supersede any alleged prior
intent on the part of Congress to bar relief to such individuals. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 195 (1887). Furthermore, the enactment of legislation providing temporary relief
from deportation to individuals fleeing civil strife constitutes state practice in conformity with
the customary norm of temporary refuge. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
72. In re Madrid-Norio, No. A24 292 084 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco Aug. 21, 1987); In
re Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco Oct. 18, 1988).
73. In reAguilar-Moreno at 9-10.
74. Id. at 21-22 (citing Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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guage of article 1 does not apply to non-international article 3 conflicts. 75 Next, Judge Hornbach ruled that in any event, article 1 is
not a self-executing treaty provision, on the ground that it is "totally
lacking in specificity and does not . . . evince a judicially enforceable
right to 'temporary refuge.'" 76 Finally, Judge Hornbach held that the
Refugee Act, as an "'inconsistent' . . . statute . . . enacted 'later in
time,"' superseded alleged United States obligations under article 1
77
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
In 1990, immigrants' rights attorneys around the country greeted
Judge Paul A. Nejelski's decision in the Santos-Gomez case 78 with great
enthusiasm. For the first time, an immigration judge had refused, on
purely international humanitarian law grounds, to order the deporta79
tion of an individual found otherwise deportable under domestic law.
After hearing the Santos family's "tale of murder, rape and destruction,"8 0 Judge Nejelski denied political asylum and withholding of
deportation to Maria Elena Santos-Gomez, her mother, and her young
son."' Having denied asylum and withholding, however, he went on
to identify the central issue of the case as "whether this family must
be forcibly returned to El Salvador by the United States government
75. Id. at 15. Specifically, Judge Hornbach ruled that the pledge by Geneva Convention
signatories to "ensure respect for the . . . Convention in all circumstances . . ." only entails
obligations between parties to an international conflict, and does not require that the United
States "permit suits... in domestic courts" by individuals fleeing civil war violence in a country
with which it is not at war.
76. Id. at 15-16; but see supra note 64 (analysis of authority asserting that treaties which

involve individual rights should be deemed self-executing).
77. Judge Hornbach found that Congress' intent in passing the Refugee Act to "exclude
persons displaced by civil or military strife. . ." from refugee status was fundamentally at odds

with any Geneva Convention obligations to provide temporary relief from deportation to such
individuals. In re Aguilar-Moreno at 19 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195
(1887); but see supra note 17.
78. In re Santos-Gomez, Santos-Trejos and Ramirez-Santos, Nos. A29 564 781, A29 564

785, and A29 564 801 (Immigr. Cr., Washington, D.C. Aug. 24, 1990).
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id.
81. Despite the petitioners' provision under duress of food, money and supplies to the
guerrillas, their desire to avoid alienating either party to the armed conflict in El Salvador, and
the harassment, rape and murder of a number of family members, in Judge Nejelski's view the
three petitioners had not been sufficiently singled out for persecution to qualify for relief under
the provisions of the Refugee Act. In re Santos-Gomez at 4-5, 6.
Neither the asylum nor the withholding of deportation provisions of the Refugee Act require
that an individual already have been singled out for persecution to qualify for relief. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(a) and 1253(a), and supra notes 11 and 12. Under the law of other circuits, the SantosGomez family's desire to remain neutral, the likelihood that they would be regarded by the
Salvadoran military as having given support to the guerrillas, and the persecution of their family
members might each constitute adequate grounds for the granting of political asylum. See
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS 479 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (neutrality is a political
opinion); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS 77 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985) (the imputation of political
opinion is a sufficient basis for asylum); Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 872-73 (9th Cir.
1990) (persecution of family members can constitute sufficient grounds for asylum).
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to experience more murder, rape and destruction or whether these
three can find a safe haven in this country until peace returns to their
homeland. '8 2 Judge Nejelski then granted the petitioners temporary
83
refuge under customary international law.
Judge Nejelski acknowledged, as did Immigration Judges Horn and
Hornbach in the Medina and Aguilar-Moreno cases, respectively, that
"flor over 200 years, customary international law has been binding
in United States courts of all kinds and has formed part of our domestic
laws." 4 However, unlike Judge Hornbach in Aguilar-Moreno, who
held that immigration judges cannot grant relief under international
law not explicitly provided in the INA,8 5 Judge Nejelski held that
"[the Immigration Court has a special obligation to follow the law and not
be swayed by the winds of politics. The Board and immigration judges
are courts bound by the law, including international law. Indeed the
Board has interpreted and been bound by international law on various
occasions. "86 Moreover, Judge Nejelski found that as a matter of due
process, immigration judges must hear customary law claims, since
deportation proceedings are the "sole and exclusive procedure for
determining deportability. 87
Judge Nejelski next identified the source of international law on
which the claimed relief might be granted. Distinguishing SantosGomez from the BIA's decision in Medina, Judge Nejelski stressed that
the Santos-Gomez' claim derived "not from the Geneva agreements,
but from humanitarian law generally. '"88 In considering the BIA's
suggestion in Medina that the existence of an alleged customary norm
could be tested by convening an international conference to address
the issue, 8 9 Judge Nejelski found that such a "'conference' . . . [had
82. In re Santos-Gomez at 2.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7 (citing, inter alia, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Pam el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Nereide, 13 U.S.
388 (1815); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985), § 102, comment j).
85. In re Aguilar-Moreno at 21-22.
86. In re Santos-Gomez at 7 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Matter of Medina, Int. Dec.
#3078 (BIA 1988) at 14-15; Matter of P-, 9 I & N Dec. 362 (BIA 1961) (BIA will look to
international law regarding dual nationality); Matter of A- G-, I.D. 3040 (BIA 1987); Matter
of Davis, 16 I & N Dec. 514 (BIA 1978) (BIA will apply United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness)).
87. Id. at 13-14.
88. Id. at 9-10. Judge Nejelski found that the BIA in Medina denied relief under the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention but deferred its finding on the existence of a

customary norm of temporary refuge "pending 'adequate indication [of) the state of customary
international law."' Id. at 10 (citing Matter of Medina at 16).
89. Matter of Medina at 16. The BIA in Medina concluded that if such a conference had

convened on the day of its decision, it would likely have concluded that a norm of temporary
refuge did not exist. Id. at 16. However, the BIA misstated the relevant issue as "whether
displaced persons should now be included within the definition of 'statutory refugees' under the
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been] held in the trial of this case" as a result of testimony given by
experts in the field of humanitarian law.90 He considered evidence
indicating that safe haven had been provided by over twenty-eight
different countries to individuals from twenty-five countries, and found
that the petitioners had "demonstrated overwhelmingly the existence
of a customary international norm of non-return to a country engaged
in civil war." 9'
Finally, Judge Nejelski articulated a two-step analysis for determining temporary refuge eligibility. He held that petitioners must
show that civil war existed in their country of origin, and that there
was a "nexus" between the conflict and their decision to flee, demonstrated by the "immediate vulnerability of the family" or by indications that "the terrors of war are close at hand." 92

2. Federal Court Consideration: International Law Arguments as a
Bar Against Deportation and a Defense Against Criminal
Prosecution-of Sanctuary Workers
Despite the apparent progress of the humanitarian law defense to
deportation in immigration court as evidenced by the Santos-Gomez
decision, the defense has met with significant resistance in federal
court. In Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 93 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the humanitarian law defense to deportation, affirming the denial of a motion for temporary refuge filed on behalf of a
Salvadoran seeking asylum. 94 Additionally, two cases arising out of
the sanctuary movement, 95 U.S. v. Aguilar9 6 and American Baptist
Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese ("ABC v. Meese"), 97 reflect the hostility
of federal courts to the humanitarian law defense during the 1980s.
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol .... "Id. The norm of temporary refuge, however, does
not seek to amend the definition of a refugee. See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 22, at 554; see
also supra notes 71, 17 and accompanying text.
90. In re Santos-Gomez at 9.
91. id. at 11-12.
92. Id. at 14-15.
93. Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1991). The petitioner has requested
a re-hearing of her claim by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petition for Rehearing and
Request for Rehearing En Banc ("Petition"), Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, No. 89-70236 (filed
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Jan. 25, 1991).
94. Id.
95. The sanctuary movement is characterized by nation-wide acts of civil disobedience in
which individual churches, synagogues and other community groups provide shelter to Central
Americans illegally residing in the United States who have fled persecution and civil strife in
Central American countries, most notably El Salvador and Guatemala. See I. BAu, THIS GRoUND
Is HOLY: CHURCH, SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMERICAN R'UGEF.s 5-8 (1985).

96. U.S. v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989).
97. ABC v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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In U.S. v. Aguilar, the Ninth Circuit upheld the convictions of a
number of sanctuary workers under section 274(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. 98 The Aguilar appellants asserted that because
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees legalizes the presence of displaced Central Americans in the United
States, regardless of whether they possess valid visas, the act of sheltering such individuals does not constitute a violation of the INA. 99
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of the sanctuary workers
and rejected their international claim. The court ruled that the Protocol requires individuals with a well-founded fear of persecution to
present themselves to immigration officials before legal status is conferred. '00 Moreover, the Ninth. Circuit held that the Protocol is not a
self-executing treaty because the determination of refugee status is
within the discretion of each signatory government. 10 1 Finally, the
court held that although the "any other law" language of INA § 274(a)
incorporates international law, "the Immigration Act's definition of
'law' does not include international norms; only conventions and
02
treaties."1
In response to the prosecution of sanctuary workers, a number of
sanctuary organizations mounted a class action suit, the American
Baptist Churches case, 103 to block federal prosecutions of such organizations and to enjoin the Attorney General from deporting Central
Americans seeking asylum. On a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants, Judge Robert F. Peckham dismissed most of the claims
raised by petitioners, including their first amendment free exercise
claim and their international humanitarian law claims.'10 ABC was
resolved in a landmark settlement on December 19, 1990, in which
4
98. U.S. v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1467; INA § 27 (a)(2) and (3), as amended, 8 U.s.C.

§ 1324(aX1)(c) (1980), provided that: "Any person . . . who . . .harbors . . . any alien ..

not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States ... shall be punished by a fine
...or imprisonment . . ." (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(c) (1988).
99. INA § 274(a) imposed criminal penalties for the harboring of certain immigrants provided
that they are "not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms
... 8
of this chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens.
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4). The defendants in the Aguilar case argued that the Refugee Protocol
constituted "ran]other law" and entitled the Central Americans to reside lawfully in the United
States,
since, as individuals with a well-founded fear of persecution, they met the Protocol
definition of "refugees." See U.S. v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1454.
100. Id. at 1454-55.
101. Id. at 1454. The Ninth Circuit in Aguilar failed to distinguish between the discretion
to grant refugee status and the absolute prohibition under article 33 of the Protocol against the
refoulement of individuals whose life or freedom would be threatened upon return. Article 33 is
arguably a self-executing treaty provision.
102. Id. at 1454. See also In re Aguilar-Moreno at 9-10; 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952).
103. ABC v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
104. Id. at 771-73. Judge Peckham did not dismiss the petitioners' claim that the asylum
adjudication process denied equal protection to Central Americans.
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the INS agreed to readjudicate approximately 150,000 denied or
pending asylum claims filed by Salvadorans and Guatemalans. The
federal government also admitted that decisions based upon ideological
considerations violated the Congressional intent underlying the Refugee Act of 1980. '05
In their initial complaint, the petitioners asserted that the Attorney
General violated both article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
the customary norm of temporary refuge in deporting Central Americans seeking asylum. 106 In response to the treaty argument, Judge
Peckham found that the protections accorded to civilians under article
3 apply only to the parties to an internal conflict, 01 7 and that article
1 is not self-executing because it lacks sufficient specificity and has
"serious foreign policy implications." 0 8 In addressing the customary
law claim, Judge Peckham concluded that "the practice of granting
temporary refuge to persons fleeing armed conflict ha[s] . . . [not]
.. .ripened into a norm of binding international law." 0 9 Moreover,
he found that Congress in the 1980 Refugee Act "specifically rejected
the asserted norm of temporary refuge [since it] ...clearly intended
that implementation of the new standards set forth in the statute
would itself bring the United States into full compliance with its
obligations under international law.""10
In appealing the denial of a motion for temporary refuge to the
Ninth Circuit in Echeverria-Hernandezv. INS,"' attorneys for the ap105. The ABC settlement halts the deportation of all Salvadorans and Guatemalans pending
the readjudication or initial determination of their asylum claims, establishes application procedures for the release of detained Salvadorans and Guatemalans, and requires the INS to grant
Salvadorans and Guatemalans work authorization while their asylum claims are pending. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, ABC v. Meese, 712 F.2d 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (No. 85-3255)
(sub noes ABC v. Thornburg) thereinafter Settlement].
In the settlement, the INS agrees to adjudicate all Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum claims
in accordance with new asylum regulations promulgated in July 1990. These regulations
establish, inter alia, a new body of asylum officers who will have exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate administrative applications for asylum and who will be trained in international law
and human rights law (see 55 Fed. Reg. 30,676 (1990) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208); see
also supra note 57). Pursuant to the settlement, the sanctuary organizations which filed the
lawsuit will play a central role in identifying individuals to conduct the training program.
Under the terms of the settlement, the INS agrees that neither United States foreign policy nor
INS border enforcement priorities are appropriate considerations in the fair evaluation of asylum
claims.

106. ABC v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. at 767.
107. Id. at 769.
108. Id. at 770 (citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374-

75 (7th Cir. 1985)).
109. Id.; but see In re Santos-Gomez, Santos-Trejos and Ramirez-Santos, Nos. A29 564 781,
A29 564 785, and A29 564 801 (Immigr. Ct., Washington, D.C. Aug. 24, 1990) at 11-12
(respondents "demonstrated overwhelmingly the existence of a customary international norm of
non-return to a country engaged in civil war").
110. Id. at 771.
111. Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688 (9th Cit. 1991).
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pellant and amici curiae decided not to rely upon the entirety of the
comprehensive three-pronged argument presented by other advocates.
In light of the vulnerabilities of various elements of the treaty prong,
including judicial skepticism regarding the scope and self-executing
character of article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the petitioner
instead concentrated on the customary law prong of the humanitarian
law defense. 112
Counsel for Echeverria cited evidence of widespread state practice
and identified manifestations of opinio Juris"1 3 which indicate that
nations feel obligated to provide temporary relief from deportation to
civil war victims. 114 While they did not make an independent argument for relief from deportation pursuant to the Fourth Geneva Convention, they cited the treaty as evidence of state practice in conformity
with the customary norm. 115 Furthermore, amici urged the use of the
Fourth Geneva Convention as an interpretive device for determining
those circumstances under which the customary norm comes into play.
They suggested that article 3 and its minimal protections against
violence to life and human dignity should be used as a benchmark to
in a
determine whether humanitarian law violations are occurring 11
6
given nation such that the norm of temporary refuge is in force.
Counsel for the petitioner in the Echeverria case also argued that
judges must consult customary international law in order to fully
effectuate the intent of Congress in passing the Immigration and
Nationality Act. In addition to citing the Paquete Habana principle
that customary law is United States law, counsel cited a nineteenthcentury case that held that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains,""' 7 and a 1982 case which held that in order "to ascertain
what Congress has authorized, one must consider the treaties, agree-

112. Brief for Petitioner at 3 [hereinafter Brief), Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS. This custom-

ary argument subsequently became the basis for Judge Nejelski's decision to grant temporary
refuge in the Santos-Gomez case.
113. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
114. Brief, Echeverria-Herandzat 8-21.
115. Id. at 18-20 (citing RESTATFMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES, § 102, comment i (stating that international treaties are an attribute of state
practice and constitute evidence of customary law)).

116. Amici urged the court to engage in a three-stage inquiry, determining first that a civil
war exists, second that article 3 is being violated, and finally that the petitioner subjectively

fears becoming a victim of the violence. Brief in Support of Amici Curiae, American Civil
Liberties Union of Southern California, Human Rights Advocates and Professor Frank C.
Newman, Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS [hereinafter Amicus Brief] at 4, n.2. This three-part
analysis is similar to the two-part test utilized by Judge Nejelski in the Santos-Gomez case. See
In re Santos-Gomez at 14, 15 and supra note 92 and accompanying text.
117. Brief, Echeverria-Hernandzat 24 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
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ments and customary international law to which the United States
subscribes .... ."118
Finally, Echeverria's attorneys argued that the 1980 Refugee Act
does not constitute controlling legislation because refugee law and the
norm of temporary refuge provide distinct forms of relief to separate
classes of people. 11 9 Furthermore, counsel asserted that the Refugee
Act could not preclude the provision of all forms of relief to victims
of war because the Attorney General is authorized to grant "extended
voluntary departure" ("EVD") on a country-wide basis to individuals
0
from nations embroiled in civil strife. 12
Petitioner's attorneys further
submitted that even if the Refugee Act served in 1980 as a rejection
of the notion that any form of relief should be extended to civil war
victims, the norm of temporary refuge only fully emerged during the
last decade. Thus under the Whitney121 "last in time" rule, such a
norm would overrule any inconsistent provision of that statute. 522
After affirming the BIA's denial of Echeverria's claims to asylum
and withholding of deportation, the Ninth Circuit rejected her claim
to temporary refuge under customary humanitarian law. 123 The court
found that the nations which provide temporary refuge to victims of
internal conflict do not act "in the belief that the practice [is)
24
required by international law.'
118. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1982).
119. Brief, Echeerria-Hernandezat 25.
120. Id. at 25-26; seealso supra note 55. EVD has been granted 16 times since 1960,
including a number of instances since the Refugee Act was passed in 1980. See Brief, EcherriaHernandez at 16 (citing INTERPRETER RELEASES 1084, 1093 (Sept. 21, 1987)).
121. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1887).
122. Brief, Echeverria-Hernandezat 26; Amicus Brief, Echeverria-Hernandezat 13; see also supra
note 17 and 77. As an example of the growth of the norm since 1980, counsel fur Echeverria
cited the UNHCR's pronouncement in 1985 that temporary refuge has attained the status of
jus cogens. Brief, Echeaewria-Hernandez at 26 n. 17; Amicus Brief, Echweria-Hernandezat .13; see
also sepra note 67.
Counsel for Echeverria asserted that jus cogens norms overrule subsequent treaties as well as
prior treaties. Whether such norms would also overcome subsequent legislation perhaps merits
further exploration. The District Court forthe District of Columbia offered an affirmative
response to the question in dicta suggesting that jus cogens norms may have the same status as
constitutional provisions. See Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Further, the new "temporary protected status" provision of the INA, which extends temporary
relief from deportation to individuals fleeing civil strife, would overrule any alleged prior
legislative intent to use the Refugee Act to isolate civil war victims from all types of relief. See
Immigration Act of 1990 § 301, Pub.L. 101-649, 104 Star. 4978 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 244A); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 195; see also infra notes 180-182 and accompanying
text.

123. See Echeverria-Hernandezat 693-94.
124. Compare id. at 693 and ABC v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("no
court has decided whether the practice of granting temporary refuge to persons fleeing armed
conflict has ripened into a norm of binding international law"); but see In reSantos-Gomez at
11-12 (respondents "demonstrated overwhelmingly the existence of a customary international
norm of non-return to a country engaged in civil war").
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The Court also found that the Refugee Act of 1980 and its "comprehensive program for the admission of refugees into this country"
preempted Echeverria's claim to temporary refuge. 125 The court further
concluded that the Attorney General's failure to grant extended voluntary departure to Salvadorans served as an additional basis for finding
that international humanitarian law was preempted. 126
Counsel for Echeverria filed a request for rehearing en banc 127 in
which they assert that the Ninth Circuit did notproperly evaluate the
full range of evidence demonstrating the existence of the customary
norm, and similarly failed to recognize the equal status of customary
and treaty-based international legal obligations. 128 Petitioner's attorneys secondly urge that the Refugee Act of 1980 does not preempt
the humanitarian norm of temporary refuge, since the "Act ... simply
brought the United States into conformity with the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . [and) did not address
. . . the issue of complying with the norm of temporary refuge for
'1 29
persons fleeing armed conflict.'
E. Strategiesfor Further Development of the InternationalLaw Defense to
Deportation
In light of the limited success of the humanitarian law defense in
United States immigration courts and its rejection by the Ninth
125. The court failed to differentiate between the separate purposes of asylum and temporary
refuge, or between the distinct characters of victims of persecution and victims displaced by
armed conflict. Compare Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS at 694 and ABC v. Meese, 712 F.Supp.
at 771 (in 1980 Congress "specifically rejected the asserted norm of temporary refuge").
126. See Echverria-Hernandez, 923 F.2d 688, 695.
127. See Petition for Rehearing, Echeverria-Hernandez[hereinafter Petition] at 7-9.
128. Id.
129. Petition, Echeerria-Herntndezat 11. Petitioner also urges in her request for rehearing
that the "temporary protected status" ("TPS") amendments to the INA (passed in November
1990, subsequent to her original request for temporary refuge) now preempt the norm of
temporary refuge, hence the court erroneously addressed the international law issue in this case.
See Petition, Echwerria-Hernandez at 4. Echeverria's attorneys have requested a stay of the
proceedings until she has been given the opportunity to apply for temporary protected status.
See Petition, Echeverria-Hernandezat 5-6.
This author believes that the new TPS provisions do not preempt the norm of temporary
refuge because there is no evidence that Congress intended the amendment to constitute
controlling legislation, and because it is doubtful that norms which have achieved jui cogen
status may be preempted by subsequent legislation. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying
text.

The TPS provisions do not provide a comprehensive framework. Instead, the legislation merely
gives the Attorney General the discretion to grant blanket relief to members of identified
nationality groups with no opportunity to appeal such executive action. There is no indication
that Congress -intended such a harsh result. Rather, the author believes, the TPS amendments
were passed to create additional protections under U.S. law for victims of internal conflict and
are themselves evidence of state action in accordance with the customary norm of temporary
refuge.
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Circuit, immigrants' rights advocates need to assess critically the
options for developing arguments for relief from deportation under
international law. While proponents of the humanitarian law theory
may choose to improve the three-pronged argument by eliminating
its weaknesses and buttressing its strengths, they may also find the
purely customary argument, which succeeded in the Santos-Gomez case,
more compelling. Alternatively, attorneys may turn to additional
sources of international law, found outside the bounds of humanitarian
law as strictly defined and within the more expansive reaches of
international human rights law. 130

1. Variations on a Theme: Strengthening the Humanitarian Law
Argument
One possible method for improving the humanitarian law defense
is to address the reservations expressed by Immigration Judge Hornbach in the Aguilar-Moreno case. 131 By clarifying those aspects of the
analysis which he found unconvincing, and to which other judges may
react similarly, advocates may prove more successful when raising these
claims in the future.
To overcome the notion that some immigration judges lack the
authority to grant relief based upon international law, advocates should
refrain from invoking the Immigration and Nationality Act. As Judge
Hornbach's opinion illustrates, 32 when attorneys rely on the INA to
demonstrate the relevance of international law, they risk creating the
impression that the INA is the source of the authority to consider
such norms. If, on the other hand, proponents of the humanitarian
law theory anchor their arguments in the Supremacy Clause, The
PaqueteHabana,1 33 and the principle that all United States courts must
uphold international treaties and customary law when not overruled
by U.S. statutes, they may persuade immigration judges that they

130. Humanitarian law norms recognizing the rights of civilians to be free from armed
attacks and other assaults on their personal dignity operate in the context of armed conflict. See
L. HENKIN, supra note 25, at 808. Human rights norms, which recognize that individuals are
subjects of public international law and can bring claims against governments, for human rights

violations are always in force, whether in war or in time of peace. See M. JtAs's, supra note 21
at 74.
131. In re Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco Oct. 18. 1988).
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
132. Judge Hornbach declined to consider the customary norm of temporary refuge because
he found that Aguilar-Moreno "hinge[d] her entire claim" on the "any other law or treaty"
language of INA section 242(b), which he found to refer exclusively to statutes and treaties. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
133. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). For a discussion of the Court's holding in the Paquete Habana,

see supra note 54.
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possess the discretion to apply international norms in deportation
proceedings.
In responding to judicial failure to recognize that article 1 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention applies to cases of internal conflict, attorneys can adopt the creative approach offered by amici in the Echeverria
case. 134 Amici suggested in their brief to the Ninth Circuit that
although in 1949 the scope of article l's application may have been
limited to international conflicts, the "ensure respect" pledge is now
also applied in the civil war context as a result of evolving state
practice. 135 Moreover, even if courts begin to acknowledge that article
1 applies to internal conflicts, advocates will need to strengthen their
argument that this provision is self-executing.
Further, advocates need to attack the notion that the obligation to
provide temporary refuge is inconsistent with Congress's intent in
passing the Refugee Act to exclude civil war victims from the refugee
definition. 136 Congress enacted the Refugee Act to bring the United
States into compliance with international refugee law. The legislation
did not address U.S. obligations arising under international humanitarian law. 137
The Echeverria case represents the first consideration by a federal
appeals court of the temporary refuge claim, and as such its rejection
is both significant and daunting. Yet, the case also represents a maturation of the humanitarian law defense to deportation and as such
may assist in rectifying some of the limitations of the three-pronged
theory. Despite the Ninth Circuit's decision, further disciplined presentation of the customary argument presented in Echeverria may bear
fruit in courts impressed, as was Judge Nejelski, by "overwhelming
[evidence of) the existence of a customary international norm of nonreturn to a country engaged in civil war." 38 Thus, advocates seeking
to promote the use of humanitarian law should strengthen the Eche'erria customary law theory by improving judicial understanding of the
power of this particular customary norm.
The Echeverria court found that "the statements of various international bodies and officials .. .are resorted to by judicial tribunals,
134. See Amicus Brief, Echeverria-Hernandez.

135. Id. at 36-37. The EchwerriaAmicus Brief points out that the International Committee
of the Red Cross, which monitors compliance with all of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, has
determined that article 1 now applies to civil wars. See Condorelli & Boisson de Chazournes,

Quelques remarques a propos de l'obligation ds Etats de 're pecter etfaire respeter' le droit international
humanitaire 'en outee circontances' in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES (C. Scinarski, ed. 1984).
136. See supra notes 68-7 1 and accompanying text. Seealso supra note 129.
137. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-33 (1987) (there is "abundant evidence
of an intent to conform the definition of 'refugee' and our asylum law to the United Nations
Protocol to which the United States has been bound since 1968 .... .
138. See In re Santos-Gomez at 2, 11-12.
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not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is."139 In
effect, the court suggested that the expert opinion cited by Echeverria
indicates that there ought to be a norm of temporary refuge, rather
0
than that such a norm currently exists. 14
The court is correct in suggesting that expert opinion is not inherently norm-creating, as are treaty provisions and state practice characterized by a sense of legal obligation. 14 1 The court also properly
clarified that when experts testify to the current validity of a norm
within the world community, their opinions merely serve as evidence
of the existence of that norm. The Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate,
however, that the expert testimony upon which the petitioner relied
points to the current recognition of the norm by states and thereby
42
serves as evidence of its existence. 1
When the UNHCR declared in 1985 that temporary refuge had
achieved the status of a peremptory or jus cogens norm, it did not
presume to turn the notion of temporary refuge into a binding rule
by institutional fiat. Rather, the UNHCR bore witness to the fact
that the norm had achieved its jus cogens status through the widespread
recognition by states of its binding force, implying obligations which
3
overrule any efforts of individual states to avoid its dictates. 14
Proponents of the customary humanitarian law defense must stress that
the norm of temporary refuge is more than a cherished hope for an
uncertain future. Rather, experts and states alike recognize that the
norm is currently in force as a binding rule from which no deviation
is tolerated. 144
It is unlikely that judicial reluctance to embrace the temporary
refuge argument is purely a function of technical flaws in the legal
analysis. Rather, the lack of receptivity on the part of the courts also
5
may stem from an institutional aversion to humanitarian law claims. 14

139. See Ecbeverria-Hewnndez, 923 F.2d 688, 693 (citing The Paquere Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900)).
140. Id. at 693.
141. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; supra note 22; see also WILLIAS & DE
MEsTRAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 21 (1987) (declarations of agencies are
"not... a 'source' but... an aid in determining custom").
142. Brief, Echverria-Hernandezat 26, note 17.
143. See U.N.H.C.R., supra note 67 at paras. 22-23.
144. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
145. For example, judges may resist accepting humanitarian law claims because they are
apprehensive about setting a precedent which may have a wide-ranging impact upon immigration
policy (the so-called "floodgate mentality"). Just as judges may allow the asylum claims of
individuals to be prejudiced by the fact that they come from countries where persecution is
widespread, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, they also may be reluctant to extend
temporary relief from deportation to individuals who have fled civil war violence for fear that
they will be followed by countless numbers of their compatriots.
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If proponents of the temporary refuge argument hope to achieve actual
relief for potential victims of civil strife, they may be wise to look
beyond the four corners of the humanitarian law theory, to seek support
in related areas of international law which have benefited from fuller
and more favorable consideration by United States courts.
2. New Directions: Analogies to Human Rights Law
Within the past decade, both United States and international courts
have been increasingly receptive to the claims of individuals alleging
human rights violations. Advocates seeking temporary refuge for civil
war victims might look to these cases as precedents for judicial consideration of international law claims, and as models for constructing
creative arguments for relief from widespread outrages against human
dignity.
a. United States Courts: Filartigav. Pena-Iralaand RodriguezFernandez
In 1980, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Alien
Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")146 provided jurisdiction for the federal
courts to hear claims by aliens in the United States seeking compensation for violations of their customary human rights which occurred
in other countries. 147 In reaching its conclusion, the court held that
torture violates customary human rights law, 148 and that the customary
prohibition against torture is a part of United States law. 149
In 1981 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in RodriguezFernandezv. Wilkinson1 50 that the indefinite detention of Cuban aliens,
prevented from entering the United States but unable to return to
Cuba, violated the international human rights norm outlawing prolonged arbitrary imprisonment, and thereby constituted an abuse of
146. Alien Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 934, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
147. Filarriga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). The question arose in an
action brought by a father and daughter against a former member of the Paraguayan secret police
alleging that he caused the death by torture and murder of their son and brother in Paraguay.
Id. at 878.
148. Id. at 884. In concluding that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations,"
id., the Second Circuit consulted various sources of customary international human rights law,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 5: "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment") and the United Nations
Declaration Against Torture. See id. at 882 and note 11 (citing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR Res. 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration) and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjetcd to
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975)).
149. Id. at 887. But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (ATCA provides jurisdiction but not cause of action for
private suits brought by aliens).
150. 645 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
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discretion by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 15' The court
held that "in upholding the plenary.power of Congress over exclusion
and deportation of aliens, the Supreme Court has sought support in
international law principles . . . . It seems proper . . . to consider
international law principles for notions of fairness as to [the] propriety
of holding aliens in imprisonment. 152 In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit
found that international law is not only a part of United States law,
but also a source of the government's power to control immigration,
3
and as such imposes limits on the exercise of that power. 15

151. Id. at 1388-90 (citing the Universal Declaration, arts. 3 and 9; and the American
Convention on Human Rights, July 4, 1977, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (explaining that the
norm against arbitrary imprisonment derives from both treaty-based and customary international
human rights law).
152. Id. at 1388.
153. Id. But see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1984) (detained
excludable aliens have no due process right in a parole hearing). The Rodriguez-Fernandez
principle, when taken to its logical end, challenges the longstanding "plenary powers!' doctrine,
which asserts that the power to control immigration predates the Constitution, and derives from
the United States' status as a sovereign nation. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
705 (1893). Because its source is outside the Constitution, the immigration power has been
thought to be unbounded by the Constitution, and hence largely immune from judicial review.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 210 (1953) ("the power to expel or exclude aliens . . . [is] largely immune from judicial
control"); U.S. v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1469 (9th Cir. 1989). Just as the power to regulate
immigration is purportedly "extra-constitutional," immigrants are considered beyond the jurisdiction of the United States courts and deemed unprotected by the Constitution. Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 231, 232 (1982).
The plenary powers doctrine, while historically entrenched, is fundamentally flawed. The
doctrine relies on a conceptual leap from the identification of an extra-constitutional source of
the immigration power to the claim that the extra-constitutional exercise of that power is
legitimate. Because the immigration power is inherent in sovereignty (see The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889)), the courts declare, it is somehow "immune from judicial
inquiry or interference" (see Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589). Yet it is just as plausible to conclude
that exercise of the immigration power must be governed by the Constitution, which was created
to subject all governmental powers to the rule of law. One should not
confuse . . . the nation as a whole with its constituent parts. [Though] [i]t can be
granted arguendo that a nation has unlimited power in international law to exclude
and to expel aliens, [i]t does not follow that the courts should refrain from determining
whether the manner in which the national legislature exercises that power comports
with the constitutional restrictions that the nation" as a whole has elected to establish.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary ConstitutionalPower, 1986 IM. & NAT.
L. REV. 81, 96, 100.
Rodriguez-Fernandez suggests that judicial review of the immigration power is necessary to
insure not only adherence to constitutional requirements, but also compliance with the dictates
of international law. While a number of Supreme Court cases have found international law to
be the underlying basis of the immigration power (sec United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299
U.S. 304, 318 (locating the source of immigration law in "the law of nations"); Fong Yne Ting,
149 U.S. at 708), the Tenth Circuit in Rodriguez-Fernandez holds that international law also
should govern the due exercise of that power. See Rodriguez-Fernandz, 654 F.2d at 1388 ("[ilt
seems proper . . . to consider international law principles for notions of fairness as to [the]
propriety of holding aliens in detention"). The Rodriguez-Fernandezcase suggests that courts may
be willing to conceive international law not as a license permitting the United States to regulate
immigration in any way it sees fit, but as a basis for challenging governmenral policy.
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In sharp contrast to In re Aguilar-Moreno, ABC v. Meese, and
Echeverria-Hernandez, the Filartiga and Rodriguez-Fernandez decisions
support the principle that petitioners may seek remedies in United
States courts under international law. The inconsistent treatment of
international law-based claims may be due to the courts' perception
that the universal outcry against torture and arbitrary imprisonment
is stronger than the global condemnation of the forcible return of
civilians to internal armed conflict. Additionally, judicial fear of "opening the floodgates," which temporary refuge petitions may activate,
154
was not a factor in the Filartiga and Rodriguez-Fernandez cases.
Nonetheless, the violence feared by those who flee civil strife often
entails human rights abuses such as loss of life, "disappearance,"' 1 5
torture and arbitrary imprisonment, which are carried out against
large sectors of the civilian population. 15 6 Non-return of individuals
to a country engaged in civil war may be needed to prevent violations
of the very same human rights norms recognized in the Filartigaand
Rodriguez-Fernandez cases. In light of the intimate connection between
internal conflict and violations of the most fundamental human rights
norms, it may be effective to base an argument for temporary refuge
in both humanitarian and human rights law.

b. International Courts: Velasquez-Rodriguez and Soering
On July 29, 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
held the government of Honduras responsible for the forcible disappearance and probable extra-judicial execution of Manfredo VelasquezRodriguez, a young Honduran student, and ordered the government
to compensate his family. 157 The court held that Velasquez' disappearance constituted a violation of his right to life, humane treatment
and personal liberty under articles 4, 5, and 7, respectively, of the
American Convention on Human Rights ("the American
158
Convention").

154. Perhaps it was easier for the Second Circuit in Filartigato grant damages for the death
by torture of one individual in what was likely an extraordinary case, than it might be for a
judge to grant temporary refuge to a petitioner who is but one of a potentially large group of

immigrants seeking to avoid deportation to a situation of widespread violence stemming from
internal conflict.
155. Disappearance is the arrest and detention of individuals, often characterized by brutal
interrogation, torture or extra-judicial execution, all without formal charges, procedures or
official acknowledgement that the individual was ever in custody. See Velasquez-Rodriguez Case,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 35, OAS/ser L./V./III. 19, doc. 13 (1988), paras. 3, 99, 149-53.
156. See AMNEsTY INTERNATiONAL REPORT, supra note 40.

157. Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, paras. 185, 189.
158. Id. paras. 186-88.
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The Velasquez-Rodriguez Case was the first contentious case to be
heard by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 15 9 The court
broke new ground in the adjudication of human rights claims by
finding the government of Honduras responsible for a pattern of human
rights abuses in which it may not have participated directly, simply
because it tolerated their occurrence. 160 The court found that by failing
to prevent the disappearance of Velasquez and by neglecting to punish
its perpetrators, the government of Honduras violated its obligation
to "ensure to all persons . . . the free and full exercise of...
[Convention] rights and freedoms .......
under article 1 of the
American Convention. 161
Less than one year after the Inter-American Court's decision in
Velasquez-Rodriguez, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in
Soering162 that the extradition by the British government of Jens Soering to the United States to face capital murder charges would constitute a violation of Soering's right to humane treatment under article
3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 163 The court reasoned that this prohibition, "also embodies an associated obligation not to put a person in a
position where he will or may suffer such treatment or punishment at
the hands of other States."'6
The Velasquez-Rodriguez and Soering cases provide guidance in constructing arguments for obtaining a grant of temporary refuge in
United States courts. Both cases suggest that governments can be held
responsible for human rights violations which they do not commit,
but nonetheless either tolerate 165 or indirectly cause. 16 The InterAmerican Court found that Honduras must take affirmative action to
prevent disappearances and to punish their perpetrators, in order to
comply with its pledge to "ensure . . . free and full exercise of...
rights . . ." in conformity with article 1 of the American Convention. 167 The court's analysis implies that to "ensure respect" for hu159. Shelton, JudicialReview of State Action by International Courts, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.

361 (1989).
160.
161.
162.
163.

Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, paras. 178, 182.
Id., paras. 161, 173, 174, 182.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. B) (1989).
Id., paras. 80, 111. The court did not base its decision on the death penalty itself, but

reasoned that in light of Soering's young age and impaired mental capacity at the time of the
murders for which he was charged, the harsh conditions at the prison in which he would probably
be incarcerated, and the likelihood of a six- to eight-year imprisonment while his appeals were
exhausted, subjecting him to the "death row phenomenon," constituted inhumane treatment.
Id., paras. 81, 107, 108, 111; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1950) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).

164. Soering, para. 82.
165. See Veasquez-Rodriguez Case, para. 173.
166. See Soering, para. 82.
167. Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, paras. 173, 174.
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manitarian protections under article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, courts in the United States should at least withhold the
deportation of Salvadoran and other nationals to situations in which
168
their basic human rights will be violated.
Soering is perhaps of even greater significance in the context of
temporary refuge because extradition, like deportation, "put[s] a person in a position where he will or may suffer ... [degrading] treatment
at the hands of [anlother State ......
169 Drawing on the logic of
Soering, attorneys in the United States can argue that because the
deportation of individuals fleeing civil war violence is likely to place
them in situations in which they are targets of such violence, such
action is inconsistent with the obligation to ensure respect for humanitarian norms. 170
c. An Expanded Concept of Non-refoulent
In addition to supporting the granting of temporary refuge under
international humanitarian law by analogy to international human
rights law, the Velasquez-Rodriguez and Soering cases suggest basing
petitions for temporary refuge in human rights law itself. By expanding the humanitarian law concept of non-refoulement to human rights
law, advocates may find available an additional form of relief against
deportation.
The term non-refoulement, which originated in article 33 of the
Refugee Convention, signifies that an individual should not be forcibly
returned to a situation in which her "life or freedom would be threatened . . ." on one of the five grounds enumerated in article 1 of the
Convention. 171 The norm of temporary refuge can be thought of as
non-refoulement in the humanitarian law context: individuals may not
168. The "ensure free and full exercise" language of article 1 of the American Convention
may appear to entail greater legal obligations than the "ensure respect" language of article 1 of
the Geneva Convention. Compare Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, para. 173 (article 1 of the American
Convention imposes a duty "to guarantee rights") with In re Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226
(Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Mar. 9, 1988) at 15 (article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
is "lacking in (the] specificity [required to] evince . . . judicially enforceable rights"). The
language of the two treaties and their authoritative interpretation suggests, however, that the
pledge to "ensure free and full exercise" and the obligation to "ensure respect" do not impose
meaningfully different standards of conduct on governments. Pictet suggests that the Geneva
Convention pledge to "ensure respect" requires affirmative conduct on the part of governments.
"[C]ontracting parties . . . should do aeeything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian
principles are applied universally." See PicrET, COMMENTARY, supra note 71, at 16 (emphasis
added).
169. Soering, para. 82.
170. A particularly compelling case against such forcible return to El Salvador stems from
the role of the United States in supporting the conflict. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.

171. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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be returned to a situation in which they would risk becoming victims
of civil war violence. 172 The non-extradition ruling of Soering, indirectly supported by the Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, implies that a third
international norm of non-refoulement may be evolving which forbids
the forcible return of individuals to situations in which widespread
violations of basic human rights are occurring, regardless of whether
they also are characterized by armed conflict. 173 This concept of "human rights non-refoulement" might be derived from both the "ensure
. . . free exercise" language of article 1 of the American Convention
and the "ensure respect" language of article 1 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. 174
172. There is a natural connection between non-refoulement under international refugee law
and non-refoulement in the humanitarian law context. International bodies have long recognized
that traditional refugees often find themselves in situations of mass influx caused by civil strife,
and that they may need temporary relief from deportation to civil war violence until their claims
to asylum based on a "well-founded fear of persecution" can adequately be addressed. See Perluss
& Hartman, supra note 36 at n. 153 (stating that since 1959, the United Nations General
Assembly has given the United Nations High Commission for Refugees ("UNHCR") the
authority to provide assistance to individuals who do not meet the Convention definition of a
refugee; G.A. Res. 1388, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959);
G.A. Res. 1673, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 28, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961)).
In 1975, the United Nations made the leap from assisting groups of individuals fleeing

widespread violence because there might be traditional refugees among them, to recognizing
that civil war victims had legitimate claims to international protection in their own right. The
United Nations General Assembly charged the UNHCR with protecting individuals who are in
so-called refugee-like situations as a result of wide-spread conditions of social upheaval which
they cannot prevent. G.A. Res. 3453, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92, U.N. Doc.
A110034 (1975).
173. While Soering does not constitute binding precedent in United States courts as it
interprets a treaty to which the United States is not a party, it may be evidence of an evolving
norm of non-refoulement in the human rights context and as such may shed light on United
States obligations under customary international law. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at
882, note 11 (international treaties and declarations may be considered by U.S. courts as evidence
of customary international law).
174. Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits violations of civilians'
rights to life, humane treatment and basic due process during time of war (see supra note 30 and
accompanying text), demonstrates that the most serious humanitarian law violations also constitute violations of fundamental human rights norms. See American Convention on Human
Rights, July 4, 1977, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (article 4-Right to Life; article 5-Right to
Humane Treatment; article 8-Right to a Fair Trial).
The connection between the temporary refuge form of non-refoulement, rooted in article I of
the Fourth Geneva Convention and customary humanitarian law, and human rights non-refoulement, implied in article 1 of the American Convention, requires recognition by the world
community that nations cannot "ensure ... free exercise" of human rights if they forcibly return
individuals to situations in which those rights are regularly violated on a massive scale. See
American Convention, art. 1.
A basis for the extension of the norm of non-refoulement from the humanitarian to the human
rights context may be found under the terms of the expanded competency of UNHCR itself.
Since 1985, UNHCR has sought under its extended mandate to protect "persons who have been
displaced from their countries owing to severe internal upheavals or armed conflict." Perluss &

Hartman, supra note 36, at note 153 (citing Note on International Protection, Thirty-sixth
Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, paras. 6, 36-37,
U.N. Doc. AIAA.961660 (1985) (emphasis added).
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Given the reluctance of United States courts to recognize the humanitarian law defense against deportation, however, immigrants'
rights advocates pursuing relief against the deportation of civil war
victims under human rights law will have to seek support beyond the
Soering decision and the broad language in article 1 of the American
and Fourth Geneva Conventions. Such support may be found in the
1984 Declaration of Cartagena, which presents an expanded conception
of a refugee that embraces individuals fleeing large scale violations of
human rights. 175

[Tlhe definition [of refugeel ...to be recommended for use
in the region includes among refugees persons who have fled
their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other cir7
cumstances which have seriously disturbed public order. 1 6

This broader definition of refugee may extend non-refoulement under
article 33 of the Refugee Convention to persons fleeing wide-spread
human rights abuses as well as those with an individualized fear of
persecution.

3. Legislative Reform
While advocates have been striving to achieve judicial recognition
of the treaty-based and customary norm of temporary refuge, efforts
also have been mounted on Capitol Hill to legislatively mandate
protection for individuals fleeing civil war violence. Since the mid1980s Congress has debated the Moakley-DeConcini bill, designed to
extend safe haven to Salvadorans in the United States in light of the
civil war occurring in their country. The bill's sponsors were responding to the failure of the Attorney General to designate Salvadorans as
177
eligible for "extended voluntary departure."
The Moakley-DeConcini bill failed in several successive legislative
sessions until November 1990, when Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to include a provision authorizing the
Attorney General to bestow "temporary protected status" on the members of individually designated nationality groups residing in the
175. See supra note 22.
176. Declaration of Cartagena, supra note 13, Conclusions and Recommendations, #3 (emphasis added).
177. See DESPITE A GzNEROUS SPInT, supra note 16 at 37-38.
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United States. 178 A related provision mandates that the Attorney
General extend temporary protected status to eligible Salvadorans for
an eighteen-month period beginning on January 1, 1991.179
While the regulations implementing the temporary status provisions have not yet been promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the new statutory language of the provision indicates
that temporary protected status may be granted to individuals from
any foreign state in which "the Attorney General finds that there is
an ongoing armed conflict . . . and, due to such conflict, requiring
the return of aliens . . . to that state . . . would pose a serious threat
to their personal safety .... .. 80
The generic temporary status provision is significant because it
establishes a statutory standard for the discretionary granting of temporary refuge to civil war victims. However, for nationals of states not
designated as beneficiaries, or those from designated states who individually do not qualify for relief, 181 the humanitarian law defense will
remain of vital significance. Moreover, the temporary protected status
provision of the INA will serve as a basis for challenging the argument
that the Refugee Act bars the provision of alternative forms of relief
to individuals fleeing civil war. 182
CONCLUSION
As the humanitarian law defense to deportation continues to be
presented in United States courts, advocates develop each prong of
the argument with increasing sophistication. While the defense has
yet to achieve widespread recognition, judges, even when denying
petitions for relief, consistently have upheld the validity of international law as United States law. 183 Further, advocates have shed mean178. 8 U.S.C. § 244A (1990). The Attorney General has discretion to designate beneficiary
nations after consultation with "appropriate agencies of the Government;" this decision is not

subject to judicial review. 8 U.S.C. §§ 244A(b)(1) and 244A(bX5)(A) (1990).
179. Immigration Act of 1990 § 303, Pub.L. 101-649, 104 Star. 5036.
180. 8 U.S.C. § 244A(b)(1)(A) (1990). Temporary protected status also can be bestowed if
the nation is experiencing an environmental disaster such as an earthquake, flood or drought, if
the nation temporarily cannot insure the repatriation of its nationals residing abroad, or if it
requests such designation. 8 U.S.C. § 244A(b)(1)(B) (1990).
181. The amendment imposes, among other requirements, the requirement that aliens from
all designated countries have been continuously physically present in the United States since the
date their state was designated, to be eligible for temporary protected status. 8 U.S.C.
§ 244A(c)(1)(A)(i).
182. Additionally, if the institutional aversion to humanitarian law claims is based in part
on a judicial reluctance to grant relief for which large numbers of people may be eligible, then
the existence of a legislatively-mandated administrative mechanism for providing blanket relief
where necessary may reassure immigration judges that it is possible for them to grant relief on
a case-by-case basis without "making public policy" in the courtroom. See supra note 145.
183. See, e.g., Matter of Medina at 14; ABC v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. at 770 and supra note
105.
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ingful light on the doctrine of self-executing treaties and have established the evidentiary basis for determining the existence of customary
norms. Moreover, they have identified relationships between humanitarian law and human rights law that may supplement and strengthen
the humanitarian law argument.
By conceiving the plight of individuals seeking temporary refuge
in the United States as the product of brutal conflicts raging in the
nations from which they flee, as well as a politicized asylum adjudication process in the United States,18 4 the humanitarian law defense
to deportation directs attention to the causes of human flight, as well
as to the need for judicial and political remedies. By expanding the
conception of refuge, international humanitarian law recognizes that
victims of generalized conditions of violence possess claims of entitlement to refuge that are as vital and as legitimate as those of persons
persecuted on an individualized basis. In so doing, the argument
contributes to the search for political solutions to the suffering taking
place in Central America and other regions of the world. 185
It is the urgency of the human condition amid the brutality of war
that makes humanitarian law such an appropriate vehicle for challenging the prerogatives of sovereignty. It is difficult to envision a more
opportune moment to restrain the exercise of sovereign power than
when such limitations may prevent further human suffering. As the
right to temporary refuge is asserted in United States courts, its
proponents subject the immigration power to the rule of law, affirming
the legal personality and human dignity of immigrants and citizens
alike.
Whether United States courts will continue to look to international
law as a basis for striking down excesses in governmental conduct
remains to be seen, but it is clear that the conceptual and legal basis
for such judicial action exists. If international legal standards of fairness
can be utilized to help set limits on the exercise of governmental
power over immigration, then perhaps "the measure of simple
justice" 186 for immigrants which Justice Jackson sought in his dissent
in Mezei will be less dream than reality.
184. Seesupra note 17 and accompanying text.
185. With respect to the prospects for a military solution in El Salvador:
It has become evident that . . . victory for either side is not in the cards. Even with
60,000 to 80,000 Salvadorans already dead, the war could continue for a long time.
it is time to reassess objectives, to abandon our pursuit of a military victory and to
make peace the overriding objective of U.S. policy.
Bell, Victory Impossible: Peace Is the Only Policy, L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, at M3, col. 1.
186. See Shaughnessy v. Meei, 345 U.S. 206, 228 (Jackson, J. dissenting) (Justice Jackson
condemned Mezei's denial of "basic fairness" in hearing procedures, urging that the provision
of due process to all immigrants was a matter of "simple justice").

